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João Maurício Adeodato, Recife / Brazil
 
 
Answers of Legal Dogmatics to two important Problems of the Philosophy of 
Law 
 
Abstract: Introduction: aims and points of departure. 1. The problem of the knowledge of law: whether 
previous general rules may support a casuistic decision. 2. The problem of legal ethics: whether there are 
autonomous rights, which do not depend on positive law. 3. The ways of modern dogmatics to deal with 
these problems. 4. The question remains the same. 
 
Introduction: aims and points of departure 
Philosophy of law has had many questions to handle. Concerning universalistic all-encompassing 
theories, the first one would be what law “is”. To rhetoricians this “ontological question” does 
not make much sense. But one may try to figure out which problems come to light when the word 
is used, which new facets have been added by modern complex societies and whether they have 
gained  specific  characteristics  in  the  periphery  of  this  society,  supposedly  globalized  around 
capital, technology and ideology
1. 
The thesis here is that, if the ontological approach is left asid e, there remain two traditional 
questions: one  concerns knowledge (epistemology) and the other addresses ethics (axiology). 
Both shall be discussed below. 
First question: what would be the limits, if there are any, for the decision of a concrete case, 
that is, if the general law expressed by the Constitution and other legal texts can play this limiting 
role, be it by means of Kelsen’s frame theory, the rational postulates from Alexy or the Judge 
Hercules suggested by Dworkin, a debate that until today divides legislativists and judicialists, at 
least in Brazil. In other words: is all law really created by legislatures or are their texts only 
random input data for the effective creation of law in the casuistic decision-making process? 
                                                           
 Professor in the Federal University of Pernambuco (jmadeodato@globo.com). 
1 To a description of the different strategies of a peripheral law system, what is not intended here, see João Maurício 
Adeodato.  Brasilien. Vorstudien zu einer emanzipatorischen Legitima tionstheorie für unterentwickelte Länder. 
Rechtstheorie,  22.  Band,  He ft  1.  Berlin:  Duncker  und  Humblot,  1991,  108 -128;  Practical  regularities  in 
underdeveloped countries, in Ralf Dreier - Robert Alexy (eds.): Legal system and practical reason - Special Issue 
ARSP, Beiheft Nr.51, Band 1, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993, 62-67; Unbeständigkeitsstrategien in Rechtssystemen 
der Peripherie: eine Form alternativen Rechts. Verfassung und Recht in Übersee, 32. Jahrgang, 3. Quartal 1999. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999, 335-346. 2 
Second question: if there are any and which are the limits for the choices of the original 
constitutional power, that is, if there are subjective rights that are valid in themselves, above 
positive law, which has to recognize them. Moreover, when social groups do not agree about 
these rights, what would be the available criteria to decide between incompatible ethical positions 
that  also  have  to  hover  above  positive  law.  Even  if  we  could  speak  of  a  universal  ethical 
consensus, which would already be problematic – like the rejection of genocide – there are many 
more  controvertible  themes,  even  inside  the  same  culture,  like  the  death  penalty,  fidelity  in 
marriage or the existence of professional politicians. The question always is to decide which 
decision would be “the correct one“. 
 
I. The problem of the knowledge of law: whether previous general rules may support a 
casuistic decision 
Every try to build an empirical science has to deal with three different elements, which cannot be 
reduced to each other, because there is a reciprocal incompatibility between a) real events, b) 
ideas (or concepts) of the human reason (or intellect) and c) linguistic (or symbolic) expressions. 
Following the tradition of the debate between Parmenides and Heraclitus, Western philosophy 
has always dealt with the two first elements, while the third has appeared later, by the linguistic 
turn of the 20
th century, despite of some predecessors along history. 
Here the real event – the first element – is seen as the unique and unrepeatable occurrence 
which is supposedly perceived independently from the subjects, along an unending flow that is 
called  time.  This  perception  also  seems  to  be  unique  and  unrepeatable,  always  peculiar  and 
particular at that moment, which is already gone. Every individual object appears irrational to 
human  beings,  it  does  not  fit  in  their  knowing  apparatus,  which  functions  only  with 
generalizations  (ideas,  concepts,  predicators).  Individualities  are  irrational  because  of  their 
unavoidable casualty. One could say: it is an ontological incompatibility
2. 
In spite of this irrationality, there is a paradox in the fact that the experience of something 
shows a kind of re-cognition; to recognize something means to associate it with remembrances of 
what “is already known” (ideas from previous experiences) and this is obtained in detriment of 
exactness.  This  complex  operation  has  to  adequate  an  undefined  and  unlimited  number  of 
                                                           
2 Nicolai Hartmann. Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1946, 302-306; João 
Maurício Adeodato. Filosofia do direito. Uma crítica à verdade na ética e na ciência (em contraposição à ontologia 
de Nicolai Hartmann), São Paulo: Saraiva, 2009 (4th ed.), 122. 3 
individualities to a defined and limited number of concepts
3. So unique objects become scalpels, 
scissors and needles, are then transformed in “chirurgic instruments” and share the concept of 
“instruments” with violins, pianos and guitars. 
Philosophers like Heraclitus and the empiricists have accentuated this ever changing aspect 
of the act of knowledge, and it is no casualty that they are inclined to skepticism. 
Western Philosophy has presented and described the second element of knowledge under 
different  names,  as  for  instance  quiditas,  essence,  Sosein,  eidos,  universals.  Following  a 
translation of Plato, the word “idea” was chosen here. Human beings have developed this “unit of 
reason” in the following manner: they experiment different actions and objects and build some 
kind of “image” that does not and cannot correspond exactly to the “real” action or object, but 
this image turns it possible to deal with this real world by means of re-cognizing “similar” events, 
organizing them in classes, putting them in contexts. The use of analogies, neuronal nets and 
other mental proceedings  yet  to  be explained render it possible for the subject  in  the act  of 
knowing to collect his or her experience in a unifying idea, and this idea provides the parameters 
to recognize new events and to communicate, to talk about them. 
Philosophers from the Parmenidean tradition have emphasized this element in knowledge 
and constituted the so called rationalism, in opposition to the empiricists. 
In this synthetic mental process it is very complicated to determinate what makes that chair 
“to be” a chair, for its form, matter, finality or efficiency do not seem to give reliable criteria to 
the abstraction of the individual characteristics of that object and its transformation into “a” chair. 
The process may become a lot more imprecise if one has to deal with more complex concepts, 
like justice or misconduct in public office. 
So the idea consists in the result of a process of depriving events of the real individualities, 
which constitute their existence, and to turn them into classes, their essence. Some philosophers 
have seen these results and their relation to the events as ontological – that is, existing from 
themselves, independent from perception – as in the case of the Platonic ideas
4, or simply as 
words, flatus vocis – like in the nominalistic Scholastic
5. 
                                                           
3 Many times “idea” and “concept” are indistinctly used. Here “concept” (significant) is understood as a linguistic 
expression of “idea” (signified). 
4 Plato. Parmenides, in: The Dialogues of Plato, translated by Benjami n Jowett, Great Books of the Western World, 
Bd. 6. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1990, 486 -511. To Plato the universals exist before the things, while to 
Aristotle the universals lie in the things themselves (these thesis were later referred to as  universalia ante rem and 
universalia in re, respectively). 
5 Bertrand Russell. History of Western Philosophy  – and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances 
from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, London: Routledge, 1993, at 175 f. and 430. 4 
Besides not matching with the real world of events, another factor for misunderstandings and 
difficulties in human relations is that these ideas cannot be precisely communicated as well, 
because the process of constructing and transmitting concepts has to go through the filter of the 
language, which involves the circumstances of the environment, chiefly the own parameters of 
the ones who receive the message. Out of this observation modern semiotics suggest the third 
element in knowledge, that is, the symbolic expression through language. Although generic like 
the ideas, linguistic predicators can neither exactly correspond to the ideas they long to express 
nor to the events which they refer to. 
This is the abyss of knowledge, for which philosophy and epistemology – and so also the 
philosophy of law – have to construct bridges. So the problem is how the general text can by any 
means express a signification to legitimate (“support”, “rationalize” etc.) a unique decision before 
a specific case. 
An additional problem is that language is a necessary condition for communication itself, so 
it seems impossible to study one without the other, what brings the question of recoursivity and 
no way out of the circle, because one has to use language to study language. 
  Although medieval nominalists paid some attention to this third element when discussing 
the universals, it was only in the 20th century that the linguistic turn made semiotics one of the 
most important trends of Western philosophy. The symbolic expression (significant) transmits 
ideas and constitutes events through communication, when the three elements are united and the 
problem of knowledge is controlled in that moment. 
All philosophers agree that events, linguistic symbols and ideas do not exactly match, but 
there seems to be certain compatibility between them; an indicium of this is that a (real) bridge 
will fall down if the (ideal) calculations made by the engineer are incorrect. One of the problems 
that  interested  Kant  was  how  it  is  possible  that  there  is  a  correspondence  between  ideal 
phenomena, like calculations about time and space, and the real world.
6 
For a jurist the problem is to adequate a statute or any other general significant of the legal 
discourse system (sources of law) to a unique case, constructing a legitimate meaning (idea) to 
support the decision. 
                                                           
6 Immanuel Kant. Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Werkausgabe - in zwölf Bänden, Bd. III, W. Weischedel (Hrsg.). 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1977, 76 (A 28, B 44) and 82 (A 35, 36; B 52). 5 
Umberto Eco resumes this problem saying that the appeal to universals is not a strength of 
human thinking, but a failure of the discourse itself. The real problem lies in the fact that the 
person always speaks in general, while the things themselves are invariably specific (singular).
7 
Friedrich Nietzsche had this abyss very clear: 
Let us think specially in the building of concepts: each word becomes immediately a 
concept, not because it should serve as something like a remembrance of the solitary and totally 
individualized initial experience which originated it, but because it   must at the same time 
comprehend innumerous, more or less similar cases, that is, strictly speaking, never equal, clearly 
unequal cases. Each concept is born through the equal treating of non-equals. As well as never a 
leaf is equal to another one, so certain is the concept of leaf built through arbitrary disregard of 
these individual differences, through an oblivion of the differentiating characters. This provokes 
the  impression  as  if  there  were  in  nature  something  beyond  the  leaves,  that  were  “leaf”, 
something like an original form, according to which all leaves would be webbed, drawn, circled, 
colored, frizzled, painted, but by unskilled hands, so that no exemplar would turn out to be a 
correct and trustworthy copy of the original form
8. 
As an empirical science – or simply a theory – the knowledge of law has to handle with the 
mutual  influence  between  real  events  (the  legally  relevant  cases),  symbolic  expressions  (the 
traditionally called sources of law) and legal ideas (legal concepts, juridical norms). 
  In case of law and other humanities, there comes a fourth complicating element, which 
does not appear in descriptive empirical sciences, that is preferences and evaluation, the different 
and eventually irreconcilable emotional ways through which human beings observe and live in 
the world. 
This is called the axiological question, also an abyss for ethics in law. 
 
                                                           
7 ECO, Umberto. Kant e l’ornitorinco. Milano: Giuffrè, 1997, 28. 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche. Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne,  in Friedrich Nietzsche: Nachgelassene 
Schriften 1870-1873. G. Colli — M. Montinari (Hrsg.). Kritische Studienausgabe — in fünfzehn Bände, vol. I. 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, 879-880: „Denken wir besonders noch an die Bildung der Begriffe: jedes Wort wird 
sofort dadurch Begriff, dass es eben nicht für das einmalige ganz und gar individualisierte Urerlebnis, dem es sein 
Entstehen verdankt, etwa als Erinnerung dienen soll, sondern zugleich für zahllose, mehr oder weniger ähnliche, d. h. 
streng  genommen  niemals  gleiche,  also  auf  lauter  ungleiche  Fälle  passen  muss.  Jeder  Begriff  entsteht  durch 
Gleichsetzen des Nicht-Gleichen. So gewiss nie ein Blatt einem anderen ganz gleich ist, so gewiss ist der Begriff 
Blatt  durch  beliebiges  Fallenlassen  dieser  individuellen  Verschiedenheiten,  durch  ein  Vergessen  des 
Unterscheidenden gebildet und erweckt nun die Vorstellung, als ob es in der Natur auβer den Blättern etwas gäbe, 
das “Blatt” wäre, etwa eine Urform, nach der alle Blätter gewebt, gezeichnet, abgezirkelt, gefärbt, gekräuselt, bemalt 
wären, aber von ungeschickten Händen, so dass kein Exemplar correkt und zuverlässig als treues Abbild der Urform 
ausgefallen wäre“. 6 
II. The problem of legal ethics: whether there are autonomous rights, which do not depend 
on positive law 
One of the most common uses of the word “right” appears to be the faculty of doing or omitting 
something and also to demand from others that they do or omit something. Legal dogmatics has 
named this faculty a subjective right, literally the right of the subject, of the person, the “faculty 
to act” inherited from the facultas agendi of antique Roman law. This does not comprise any 
possible capacity of action or omission, but only those that are protected and guaranteed by 
objective law, by the “norm to act”, norma agendi in Rome. The English language has kept the 
difference  with  the  words  “right”  and  “law”,  whereas  other  Western  languages  need  the 
adjectives “subjective” and “objective” to contemplate both concepts, once the substantive is the 
same: “direito”, “derecho”, “diritto”, “droit”, “Recht”. 
  The concept of (subjective) right has become one of the most important in modern theory 
of law: since the 19
th century, subjective rights have come out of the exclusive private sphere to 
public law, being increasingly incorporated by national constitutions and international treaties 
and statutes
9. 
  According to an old tradition, that traces back at least to classical Greece, the strength of 
natural law is due to the fact that there are certain rights which do not depend on any  form of 
recognition from any instance of secular political power. This is why the metaphor “natural” 
rights is applied, for the forces of nature – like storms, thunders and floods – remain beyond the 
will of human beings. 
When the first positivists appear, in late modernity, the Western philosophy of law may be 
seen like divided in two main streams: for the traditional natural law conceptions, a person has 
certain specific rights only for being human and the positive legal order has to recognize, respect 
and protect them; the new positivist approach defends that a person only has the rights conceded 
by objective law – that is, by the commands of the effective political power. 
Two opposed contractualist philosophers could well show this point of departure. 
To Jean-Jacques  Rousseau, the social  contract  occurs  between the citizen and the State, 
which brings about mutual rights and duties for both parts. Each person carries natural rights 
from the state of nature and those limit the power of the State: 
                                                           
9 Klaus F. Röhl. Allgemeine Rechtslehre – ein Lehrbuch. Köln / Berlin / Bonn / München: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2., neu bearbeitete Auflage, 2001, 328. 7 
One sees by that formula that the act of association reassures a reciprocal engagement of the 
public with the individuals and that each individual, contracting, so to say, with his own self, is 
engaged by a double relation, that is, as member of the sovereign before the individuals and as 
member of the State before the sovereign.
10 
The “pouvoir constituant” of the social contract is thus bilateral. 
Thomas Hobbes teaches that the parts of the social contract are the citizens themselves and 
that the State does not participate in it, but is born of it, constitutes its result. So the State has no 
debt at all concerning the citizens. The people have given away all their natural rights to fight for 
space and living in exchange for safety, every member of society has  done so. So the State 
determines in social life which are the subjective rights of the citizens, for these have kept no 
other natural right besides the existence, the own life, and everything else is a concession from 
the Leviathan
11. 
This way Rousseau preaches the superiority of subjective rights: they are independent from 
objective law. Hobbes goes in the other direction: objective law rules which are the subjective 
rights. 
The dilemma for the next generations of jurists was that, on the one hand, rights would 
depend on a very uncertain, transcendent basis, whose empirical verification and control showed 
to be very difficult, perhaps impossible, like the will of God, the human reason, the  volonté 
génerale or the objektiver Geist, supposedly the original sources of subjective rights according to 
legal  philosophers;  on  the  other  hand,  the  person  would  be  under  the  arbitrariness  and 
omnipotence of the State, that is, of the actual governments, according to positivists. 
From an ethical perspective, the victorious legal positivism had to be able to distinguish law 
from arbitrariness in order to defend itself from the accusation of legitimating any rule, regardless 
of any ethical content. This was an exigency of the also triumphant emerging democratic ideas: 
new theories were necessary to explain and support the contemporary Leviathan. 
The  solution:  the  subjective  rights  had  to  find  a  fundament  that,  without  grasping  at 
transcendent, non-empirical basis, would not be reduced to force and to the simple will of the 
                                                           
10 Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Du contract social ou principes du droit politique. Amsterdam: chez Marc Michel Rey, 
1762,  Ch.  VII,  “Du  Souverain” :  “On  voit  par  cette  formule  que  l'acte  d'association  renferme  un  engagement 
réciproque du public avec les particuliers, et que chaque individu, contractant, pour ainsi dire, avec lui-même, se 
trouve  engagé  sous  un  double  rapport;  savoir,  comme  membre  du  souverain  envers  les  particuliers,  et  comme 
membre de l'Etat envers le souverain.” 
11 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan or Matter, form and power of a state ecclesiastical and civil, Great Books of the 
Western World. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1990, vol. 21, p. 39-283, 101. 8 
State and eventual governments. One can think that these new theories did not get anywhere and 
that their basis were as metaphysical as the theories of natural law, but they were surely original. 
They were original because they stated, like the schools of natural law, that the foundations of the 
legitimacy  of  law  were  above  the  arbitrariness  of  governments,  but  also  sustained,  like  the 
positivists, that those sources were empirical and scientifically investigable. 
That was the path opened by the “theories of the will”, according to which the subjective 
rights are “ein Gebiet, worin der Wille herrscht”
12, and this is the will of the individual person, 
not the will of the government. The validity of rights like self determination, property or the 
pursuit of happiness does not come out of a concession from the State, but are justified because 
all individual citizens want them. This will is seen as a concrete and observable phenomenon and 
not as something abstract outside human experience. 
Critics have argued that rights cannot base on the will, for many people have rights that they 
do not even understand – as for instance small children, people with mental malfunctions or 
simply people who ignore their rights – and no one can wish something unperceived. There are 
also persons who have rights they expressly do not want to have, as it may be the case with 
suicides and their right to live. 
One of those critics of the theories of the will, Rudolf von Jhering brings the concept of 
interest to explain subjective rights. Interest is a kind of unpersonalized will, a will that every 
ideal individual would have if rationally (abstractly) observed. The goal (Zweck) is responsible 
for the subjective rights, for law constitutes a mean to an end, in consonance with a utilitarian 
Ethics guided by advantage, profit and use. This is why the heir has the right to his heritage even 
if he does not know about it. While interest is the content, the protection provided by objective 
law is the form of subjective rights, expressing the already mentioned facultas agendi of old 
Roman law, the protection to sue before the courts
13. 
Subsequently the Interessentheorien were also criticized: as there are some interests that are 
not sources of rights, like in case of sellers and buyers of illegal material, the subjective rights 
seem to be much more supported by the protection of objective law than to come solely from 
substantial interests; as State and government are responsible for this protection, there is a return 
to Hobbes and to the superiority of objective law. 
                                                           
12 Friedrich Carl von Savigny. System des heutigen Römischen Rechts. Berlin: Veit, 1840, Bd. 1, §§ 4 f., 7 f. 
13 Rudolf von Jhering.  Geist des romischen Rechts auf den v erschiedenen Stüfen seiner Entwickelung.  Leipzig: 
Breitkopf & Härtel, Bd. III, 3. Auflage, 338. 9 
The eclectic theories try to conciliate the theories of the will and of the interest and turn out 
to  be  defended  in  the  Traktat  der  Pandekten,  organized  by  Regelsberger,  by  Georg  Jellinek 
(„Wille und Interesse oder Gut gehören daher im Begriffe des Rechtes notwendig zusammen“
14) 
and by Bernhard Windscheid (the subjective right is „eine Macht des Willens, von der rechtlichen 
Ordnung geschützt“
15). 
The monist theory from Hans Kelsen tries to get out of this debate about which shall prevail, 
as long as he states that this dichotomy between law and rights is a false one, because they only 
make sense together, they are faces of the same coin: on one side, a faculty to do something can 
only be called a right if it is guaranteed by the objective law; on the other, a general rule cannot 
be defined as law unless it supports certain specific possibilities of action, subjective rights
16. 
In this monist way, the separations between natural and positive law and between objective 
law and subjective rights disappear  in the praxis, as long as modern constitutions  – the most 
important  part  of  objective  law  –  started  to  contain  declarations  of  subjective  rights  – 
fundamental, constitutional or simply human – that then become positive law. 
Obviously  the  ethical  choice  that  this  law  dogmatizes  will  correspond  to  the  values, 
ideologies (or whatever these ethical preferences may be called) of a certain social group. The 
dogmatization of law and the victory of positivism have brought new strategies to deal with both 
problems in law practice. 
 
III. The ways of modern dogmatics to deal with these problems 
The dogmatically organized law exhibits several different characteristics, of which only five will 
be highlighted here – under the point of view of the analytical rhetoric and with didactical aims, 
for these conditions and constraints are never isolated
17. 
First, the production (positivization) of normative texts (acts, decrees, statutes, judicial 
precedents), to which all involved parts and issues must refer and which result fro m previous 
procedural rules; second, the hermeneutics, the construction of meaning for the legal concepts 
from the chosen normative texts, what shall enable the decision of the conflict; third, the actual 
argumentation that must appeal to the chosen texts  in order to persuade the other parts that the 
                                                           
14  Georg  Jellinek.  System  der  subjektiven  öffentlichen  Rechte.  Tübingen:  Mohr  (Paul  Siebeck),  1905  (zweite 
durchgesehene und vermehrte Auflage), 44. 
15 Bernhard Windscheid. Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts. Frankfurt a. M.: Rutten & Loening, 1891, § 37, 87 f. 
16 Hans Kelsen. Allgemeine Staatslehre. Wien: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1993, 55. 
17 Ottmar Ballweg. Analytische Rhetorik als juristische Grundlagenforschung,  in Robert Alexy; Ralf Dreier; und 
Ulfrid Neumann (Hrsg.). Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 44. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1991, 45-54. 10 
meanings attributed in phase two are these and not those, that the correct construction is that 
particular one; fourth, the decision that must come out of the three previous steps and of the 
prohibition  of  non  liquet,  the  decision  that  determines  the  final  meaning  of  the  general  law 
concerning  the  concrete  case;  fifth,  the  justification  of  why  those  specific  positivization, 
interpretation, argumentation and decision are correct and not the other ones, mainly before the 
parts who are dissatisfied with the actual decision. 
Comparing the dogmatic way of treating conflicts with the problem of knowledge in general, 
one sees that the first postulate of dogmatics – the constraint to refer to the valid sources of law – 
corresponds to the symbolic expression of the norm. The second constraint is the attribution of 
meaning  to  those  chosen  sources  through  interpretation.  The  third  consists  in  the  legal 
argumentation, whose goal is to confront interpretations and determine the predominant one. 
Both correspond to the idea that the linguistic expression intends to deliver. The fourth constraint, 
the decision, concerns the third element of knowledge, that is, the event, the concrete conflict that 
has to be “solved”, when dogmatic law interferes and helps to build facts and constitute reality. 
The fifth constraint responds to the axiological problem of law and its connection with subjective 
rights. 
In Western democratic systems, conformed by the theory of the division of powers, the duty 
of  producing  general  rules  should  belong  to  the  competences  of  the  Legislative;  in  the 
contemporary world, however, and even more in underdeveloped countries, it comes more and 
more into the tasks of the Executive and Judiciary powers. 
This happens not only because the Executive promulgates general texts of law exactly like 
the Legislative does – as for example, the “provisory measures” in Brazil – but also because it 
has the function of producing texts with less degree of generality in order to reduce the meaning 
of those other more general texts of the Constitution or the law – like regulations and resolutions 
that will consequently serve as new obligatory points of departure – which become increasingly 
more important to daily life – like the normative instructions of the Central Bank (or the Fed) or 
the acts of the regulatory agencies. 
The Judiciary has also taken some of the power originally separated for the Legislative, once 
the  normative  general  text  produced  by  legislators  (the  linguistic  significant)  must  have  a 
hermeneutical meaning (the idea), which is precisely the function of judges to provide, because 
the comprehension can  only be provided before the real  case (the  event). This  is  the act  of 
knowledge  of  law.  So  judicial  dogmatics  can  literally  never  decide  against  the  written  law, 11 
because it is exactly this jurisdiction that determines the meaning of legal texts. Of course there 
may  be  a  couple  of  sentences  that  are  later  invalidated,  declared  against  the  law  and  the 
Constitution by higher courts, but not a precedent from the higher courts themselves, that would 
be a contradictio in terminis. The situation does not change if the precedent is modified, because 
this will be a new real, concrete, empirical meaning, a temporary solution to the problem of 
knowledge. 
The first constraint is then to choose valid texts among the so called sources of law, whose 
meanings will provide the basis for the whole procedure. This is the origin of the expression legal 
“dogmatics”, for those texts constitute the dogmas, in the sense that they cannot be ignored and 
that valid texts can only be confronted with valid texts. The sources of law are the symbolic 
expressions of the legal norms, significants of meanings before the case. Of course these valid 
sources can also be oral and gestural, but in modern law they are mainly textual. 
Secondly there is the constraint to interpret the texts brought to the debate in step one, that 
is, give them meaning concerning the conflict, the concrete case that started the whole thing, for 
the text is not the “carrier” of a correct interpretation of the norm, but only a means to get to 
different and concurrent interpretations and interests
18. The law system, including jurisprudence, 
has to produce the winning meaning for the alleged sources of law before the case. This meaning 
is the spoken law, in the end the definitive decision, against which  no more appeals  are 
acceptable. 
This is done through a reduction of the ambiguity and vagueness of the chosen texts 
concerning the concrete case, before which each competing orator has to suggest what the terms 
of the rules concretely mean in order to get to the aimed decision. 
In the third place there is the constraint to bind all introduced arguments to the previously 
chosen valid texts and to persuade the other participants of the deciding process that the meaning 
attributed  by  the  previous  interpretation  is  the  correct  one.  So  the  dogmatic  validity  of  an 
argument is not conditioned by external factors like moral justice, scientific truth, reasonability or 
even considered established facts. Here lie the roots of the independence of the “legal truth” (the 
decision) concerning “reality”, what is well expressed by the lawyer’s old saying “what is not in 
the legal files is not in the world”. This third step constitutes the core of legal argumentation, 
strictly speaking, the moment of persuasion. 
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In the fourth place comes the constraint to decide about each and every conflict that the legal 
order rules as relevant, what corresponds to the prohibition of non liquet. The modern judge or 
any instance that has to decide inside dogmatic procedures cannot abstain from deciding, cannot 
behave like Solomon or Pilate. Each legally qualified question hast to be answered (dokein) by 
the system. 
The  fifth  constraint  of  the  dogmatic  way  of  treating  those  two  major  problems  of  the 
philosophy of law is the justification of the decision, which includes the problem of legitimacy. 
Taking the pyramidal, dogmatically hierarchical organization of law as an example, obedience to 
the lower sources of law is justified by means of a higher source in which the lower is based, and 
so on, until the top of the pyramid, where the Constitution is responsible for the legitimacy of the 
whole system. 
For  the  solution  of  this  problem  it  is  enough  to  observe  the  concept  of  justice  of 
contemporary tribunals, which are responsible – in a very literal and also philosophical sense – 
for the “realization” of law and legal norms. “Just” and “correct” is the decision allegedly based 
on the rules that were established by the dogmatic system. So the concept of just and unjust 
remains inside positive law and depends on each legal system. 
 
IV. The question remains the same 
This brings a problem to the universalization of (subjective) rights in a context of an international 
law that is not dogmatically organized. Concerning the extreme inequalities in life standards 
throughout the world, one more remark will conclude this paper. 
One should not expect that a population living in misery, whose minimal basic needs are far 
from  being  satisfied,  people  who  are  starving,  without  education  and  in  permanent  fear  of 
organized  criminality  would  be  concerned  to  support  an  international  criminal  court,  the 
protection of the rain forests or the prohibition of torture and cruel punishments. 
The universalization of a supposed rational law may lead to a kind of ethical arrogance, no 
matter what content it presents. It sure is possible that young terrorists or hungry workers be not 
persuaded by “rational” rules of argumentation, not to mention other situations when people 
simply do not want to be convinced by these standards. 
Diverging from the theories that claim universal rationality, for example, one can assert that 
every  positive  law  has  a  certain  moral  content;  but  this  content  is  not  in  itself  valid,  it  is 
constituted  by  temporary  victorious  meanings  inside  communication.  Naturally,  if  the 13 
Constitution  states  that  all  human  beings  are  equal,  all  legislators,  judges  and  other  public 
officials shall accept and follow the content of this moral choice. Every positivist would agree 
with  this,  no  question  about  it.  The  problem  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  constituent  power  (the 
“pouvoir constituent”) may choose any other moral contents as well and these will propitiate 
other parameters to the elaboration of laws and decision of cases. If there exists a positive and 
effective  legal  sanction  that  commands  lashing  or  lapidation  of  infidel  married  women,  this 
happens not only because these moral option is seen as just and adequate by some social group in 
that society, but also because that group has managed to win the struggle for law or to transform 
their ethical convictions into positive, that is, obligatory law – even for the ones who do not agree 
with them, as always. 
After the determination of those basic ethical contents by the positive legal order, that result 
from the political oppositions between different moral conceptions, the problems of legitimacy 
and subjective rights become a question of legal validity and efficacy: a fair and just law is the 
one that comes from a competent authority and follows the regular rites and proceedings. This 
formalization is the dogmatic solution to the ever changing character of the ethical content of law 
in a complex society. 
Even if a consensus about this ethical content were possible inside the national State, the 
difficulties for its universalization are more clearly perceived observing international law. In spite 
of  his  enlightened  ideal  of  an  international  community,  Kant  warns  that  the  least  and 
indispensable condition for it would be the existence of a sovereign international tribunal, for 
„Das Recht ist mit der Befugnis zu zwingen verbunden“
19. 
Concerning the thesis  that  human  rights have to be universalized because they  form  an 
ethical minimum – within the frame of the jusnaturalistic ideal of rights ontologically valid in 
themselves,  independent  from  and  above  any  constitutional  power  –,  rights  that  would 
supposedly be on their way to universalization, mainly after the fall of the Berliner wall and of 
the Soviet Union, as part of a „post-nationalen Konstellation“
20, one should notice that there still 
seems to be a long and winding road before that, if any at all. Empirical observations show that 
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international enforcement of criminal law, for example, succeeds only when the strong States 
agree to punish the weak ones, what seems to be far away from Kant’s International Court. 
Contemporary  non-positivist  jurists  appeal  to  the  necessity  of  rules  with  certain  moral 
content,  like  the  formula  of  Gustav  Radbruch  against  the  “unbearable  non-law”  („das 
unerträgliche  Unrecht“),  that  would  have  no  procedural  character,  or  at  least  to  rules  that, 
although  procedural,  would  propitiate  moral  developments,  like  “everyone  has  the  right  to 
participate in the discussion (because all shall be equal before the law)”
21. 
It rather seems that this search for moral standards valid in themselves simply reflects the 
actual  axiological  state  of  the  art  in  today’s  dominant  nations  of  the  Western  world. 
Unfortunately,  the  historical  development  of  the  international  relations  reveals  that  on  every 
occasion in which the interests of the powerful are at stake, the human rights of the fragile find no 
place in the post-national constellation. 
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